It is shown that the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen conclusion concerning the incompleteness' of Quantum Mechanics is invalidated by two logical errors in their argument. If it were possible to perform the proposed gedanken experiment it would, in fact, show that Quantum Mechanics is complete' for the observables discussed. Because, however, of the non square-integrable nature of the wave function, the proposed experiment gives vanishing probabilities for measurements performed in finite intervals of configuration or momentum space. Hence no conclusion as to the `completeness', or otherwise, of Quantum Mechanics can be drawn from the experiment.
From a phenomenological and experimental viewpoint, quantum mechanics is remarkably successful in explaining effects and processes in the microscopic world. Recently, however, a growing body of literature has revisited the theory's own formal foundations, specifically addressing issues of self-consistency and completeness. As a major historical example of these foundational challenges, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument famously claimed that the theory is incomplete. While many valid criticisms and refutations of the EPR logic exist, they generally rely on a combination of technical results and conceptual objections to EPR's interpretive assumptions, thus transcending the plain quantum framework itself. Motivated by these trends of examining the theory's structural limits, here we revisit the EPR argument. Focusing on elements essential to the EPR reasoning, we first analyze general quantum correlations for EPR states: (i) the fact that their observables are always associated with non-commuting operators, and (ii) the nature of the correlated information obtained through measurement. From these two points alone, and relying strictly on the core rules of quantum mechanics, we demonstrate how to overturn the alleged EPR incompleteness without invoking any extraneous propositions. Consequently, we show that the standard formalism alone suffices to resolve such type of skepticism regarding the theory's physical reach. This offers, at least in a paradigmatic instance, a powerful indication of a structurally well-founded, self-consistent quantum theory.
In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper in which they claimed that the whole formalism of quantum mechanics together with what they called "Reality Criterion" imply that quantum mechanics cannot be complete. That is, there must exist some elements of reality that are not described by quantum mechanics. There must be, they concluded, a more complete description of physical reality behind quantum mechanics. There must be a state, a hidden variable, characterizing the state of affairs in the world in more details than the quantum mechanical state, something that also reflects the missing elements of reality. Under some further but quite plausible assumptions, this conclusion implies that in some spin-correlation experiments the measured quantum mechanical probabilities should satisfy particular inequalities (Bell-type inequalities). The paradox consists in the fact that quantum probabilities do not satisfy these inequalities. And this paradoxical fact has been confirmed by several laboratory experiments in the last three decades. The problem is still open and hotly debated among both physicists and philosophers. It has motivated a wide range of research from the most fundamental quantum mechanical experiments through foundations of probability theory to the theory of stochastic causality as well as the metaphysics of free will.
In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper [17] in which they claimed that the whole formalism of quantum mechanics together with what they called "Reality Criterion" imply that quantum mechanics cannot be complete.That is, there must exist some elements of reality that are not described by quantum mechanics.There must be, they concluded, a more complete description of physical reality behind quantum mechanics.There must be a state, a hidden variable, characterizing the state of affairs in the world in more details than the quantum mechanical state, something that also reflects the missing elements of reality.Under some further but quite plausible assumptions, this conclusion implies that in some spin-correlation experiments the measured quantum mechanical probabilities should satisfy particular inequalities (Bell-type inequalities).The paradox consists in the fact that quantum probabilities do not satisfy these inequalities.And this paradoxical fact has been confirmed by several laboratory experiments in the last three decades.The problem is still open and hotly debated among both physicists and philosophers.It has motivated a wide range of research from the most fundamental quantum mechanical experiments through foundations of probability theory to the theory of stochastic causality as well as the metaphysics of free will.
Based on a thought experiment the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paper’s authors concluded that in quantum mechanics the mathematical objects called wave functions fail to describe the physical reality and consequently quantum theory is incomplete. They left open the question of whether or not a complete description of the physical reality exists, but expressed their belief that such a complete theory is possible. In this paper I show that indeed a theory that gives a complete description of the physical reality exists.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox was presented as an argument that quantum mechanics is an incomplete description of physical reality. However, the premises on which the argument is based are falsifiable by Bell experiments. In this paper, we examine the EPR paradox from the perspective of Schrodinger's reply to EPR. Schrodinger pointed out that the correlated states of the paradox enable the simultaneous measurement of
x^ and
p^, one by direct, the other by indirect measurement. Schrodinger's analysis takes on a timely importance because a recent experiment realizes these correlations for macroscopic atomic systems. Different to the original argument, Schrodinger's analysis applies to the experiment at the time when the measurement settings have been fixed. In this context, a subset of local realistic assumptions (not negated by Bell's theorem) implies that
x and
p are simultaneously precisely defined. Hence, an alternative EPR argument can be presented that quantum mechanics is incomplete, based on a set of (arguably) nonfalsifiable premises. As systems are amplified, macroscopic realism can be invoked, and the premises are referred to as weak macroscopic realism (wMR). In this paper, we propose a realization of Schrodinger's gedanken experiment where field quadrature phase amplitudes
X^ and
P^ replace position and momentum. Assuming wMR, we derive a criterion for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics, showing that the criterion is feasible for current experiments. Questions raised by Schrodinger are resolved. By performing simulations based on an objective-field (
Q-based) model for quantum mechanics, we illustrate the emergence on amplification of simultaneous predetermined values for
X^ and
P^. The values can be regarded as weak elements of reality, along the lines of Bell's macroscopic beables.