The quantum states corresponding to a secret key are characterized using the so-called private states, where the key part consisting of a secret key is shielded by the additional systems. Based on the construction, it was shown that a secret key can be distilled from bound entangled states. In this work, I consider the shielded two-qubit states in a key-distillation scenario and derive the conditions under which a secret key can be distilled using the recurrence protocol or the two-way classical distillation, advantage distillation together with one-way postprocessing. From the security conditions, it is shown that a secret key can be distilled from bound entangled states in a much wider range. In addition, I consider the case that in which white noise is added to quantum states and show that the classical distillation protocol still works despite a certain amount of noise although the recurrence protocol does not.
The quantum states corresponding to a secret key are characterized using the so-called private states, where the key part consisting of a secret key is shielded by the additional systems. Based on the construction, it was shown that a secret key can be distilled from bound entangled states. In this work, I consider the shielded two-qubit states in a key-distillation scenario and derive the conditions under which a secret key can be distilled using the recurrence protocol or the two-way classical distillation, advantage distillation together with one-way postprocessing. From the security conditions, it is shown that a secret key can be distilled from bound entangled states in a much wider range. In addition, I consider the case that in which white noise is added to quantum states and show that the classical distillation protocol still works despite a certain amount of noise although the recurrence protocol does not.
Realizing secure communication between distant parties is one of the main goals of quantum technology. Although quantum key distribution (QKD) promises information-theoretic security for sharing a secret key, the key rate heavily depends on the level of noise in the quantum channel. To overcome the noise, both quantum and classical techniques exist, i.e., entanglement distillation and classical advantage distillation. So far, these techniques have only been used separately from each other. Herein, we present a two-stage distillation scheme concatenating entanglement distillation with classical advantage distillation. For the advantage distillation, we utilize a fixed protocol, specifically, the repetition code; in the case of entanglement distillation, we employ an enumeration algorithm to find an optimal protocol. We test our scheme for noisy entangled states and demonstrate its quantitative advantage: Our two-stage distillation scheme achieves finite key rates even in a high-noise regime where entanglement distillation or advantage distillation alone cannot afford key sharing. We also calculate the security bounds for relevant QKD protocols with our key-distillation scheme and show that they exceed the previous security bounds on the critical quantum bit error rates with only advantage distillation. Since the advantage distillation part does not introduce further requirements for quantum resources other than those required for entanglement distillation, the proposed scheme is well suited for quantum key distribution tasks with entanglement distribution networks.
Bound secret information is classical information that contains secrecy but from which secrecy cannot be extracted. The existence of bound secrecy has been conjectured but is currently unproven, and in this work we provide analytical and numerical evidence for its existence. Specifically, we consider two-way postprocessing protocols in prepare-and-measure quantum key distribution based on the well-known six-state signal states. In terms of the quantum bit-error rate Q of the classical data, such protocols currently exist for $Q<\frac{5\ensuremath{-}\sqrt{5}}{10}\ensuremath{\approx}27.6%$. On the other hand, for $Q\ensuremath{\ge}\frac{1}{3}$ no such protocol can exist as the observed data are compatible with an intercept-resend attack. This leaves the interesting question of whether successful protocols exist in the interval $\frac{5\ensuremath{-}\sqrt{5}}{10}\ensuremath{\le}Q<\frac{1}{3}$. Previous work has shown that a necessary condition for the existence of two-way postprocessing protocols for distilling secret keys is breaking the symmetric extendability of the underlying quantum state shared by Alice and Bob. Using this result, it has been proven that symmetric extendability can be broken up to the 27.6 lower bound using the advantage distillation protocol. In this work, we first show that to break symmetric extendability it is sufficient to consider a generalized form of advantage distillation consisting of one round of postselection by Bob on a block of his data. We then provide evidence that such generalized protocols cannot break symmetric extendability beyond 27.6. We thus have evidence to believe that 27.6 is an upper bound on two-way postprocessing and that the interval $\frac{5\ensuremath{-}\sqrt{5}}{10}\ensuremath{\le}Q<\frac{1}{3}$ is a domain of bound secrecy.
In this paper, we develop a formalism for distilling a classical key from a quantum state in a systematic way, expanding on our previous work on a secure key from bound entanglement (Horodecki, 2005). More detailed proofs, discussion, and examples are provided of the main results. Namely, we demonstrate that all quantum cryptographic protocols can be recast in a way which looks like entanglement theory, with the only change being that instead of distilling Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) pairs, the parties distill private states. The form of these general private states are given, and we show that there are a number of useful ways of expressing them. Some of the private states can be approximated by certain states, which are bound entangled. Thus, distillable entanglement is not a requirement for a private key. We find that such bound entangled states are useful for a cryptographic primitive we call a controlled private quantum channel (PQC). We also find a general class of states, which have negative partial transpose (are NPT), but which appear to be bound entangled. The relative entropy distance is shown to be an upper bound on the rate of a key. This allows us to compute theexactvalue of a distillable key for a certain class of private states.
An important contribution to the understanding of quantum key distribution has been the discovery of entangled states from which secret bits, but no maximally entangled states, can be extracted [Horodecki et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 200501 (2005)PRLTAO0031-900710.1103/PhysRevLett.94.200501]. The construction of those states was based on an intuition that the quantum mechanical phenomena of data hiding and privacy might be related. In this Letter we firmly connect these two phenomena and highlight three aspects of this result. First, we simplify the definition of the secret key rate. Second, we give a formula for the one-way distillable entanglement of certain private states. Third, we consider the problem of extending the distance of quantum key distribution with help of intermediate stations, a setting called the quantum key repeater. We show that for protocols that first distill private states, it is essentially optimal to use the standard quantum repeater protocol based on entanglement distillation and entanglement swapping.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) achieves information-theoretic security for a shared secret key, using distributed quantum states. To establish secret bits, two honest parties apply key distillation protocols to the resulting measurement outcomes. In this work, we establish a rigorous connection between the key rate achievable by applying two-way key distillation, such as advantage distillation, and quantum hypothesis testing, via an integral representation of the conditional entropy in terms of the error probabilities of binary state discrimination. This connection significantly improves bounds on key rates at finite blocklengths relative to existing fidelity-based bounds. Moreover, in an important special case, it closes the gap between the known sufficient and conjectured necessary conditions for key generation in the large-blocklength limit. More generally, it establishes a matching asymptotic necessary condition, leaving the corresponding finite-blocklength result open. More broadly, our work shows how results in quantum hypothesis testing can directly sharpen the security analysis of QKD.
We study and solve the problem of distilling a secret key from quantum states representing correlation between two parties (Alice and Bob) and an eavesdropper (Eve) via one–way public discussion: we prove a coding theorem to achieve the ‘wire–tapper’ bound, the difference of the mutual information Alice–Bob and that of Alice–Eve, for so–called classical–quantum–quantum–correlations, via one–way public communication. This result yields information–theoretic formulae for the distillable secret key, giving ‘ultimate’ key rate bounds if Eve is assumed to possess a purification of Alice and Bob's joint state. Specializing our protocol somewhat and making it coherent leads us to a protocol of entanglement distillation via one–way LOCC (local operations and classical communication) which is asymptotically optimal: in fact we prove the so–called ‘hashing inequality’, which says that the coherent information (i.e. the negative conditional von Neumann entropy) is an achievable Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen rate. This result is known to imply a whole set of distillation and capacity formulae, which we briefly review.