The classic “Bell’s Theorem” of Clauser, Holt, Shimony and Horne tells us that we must give up at least one of: (1) objective reality (aka “hidden variables”); (2) locality; or (3) time-forwards macroscopic statistics (aka “causality”). The orthodox Copenhagen version of physics gives up the first. The many-worlds theory of Everett and Wheeler gives up the second. The backwards-time theory of physics (BTP) gives up the third. Contrary to conventional wisdom, empirical evidence strongly favors Everett-Wheeler over orthodox Copenhagen. BTP allows two major variations—a many-worlds version and a neoclassical version based on Partial Differential Equations (PDE), in the spirit of Einstein. Section 2 of this paper discusses the origins of quantum measurement according to BTP, focusing on the issue of how we represent condensed matter objects like polarizers in a model “Bell’s Theorem” experiment. The backwards time telegraph (BTT) is not ruled out in BTP, but is highly speculative for now, as will be discussed.
The classic “Bell’s Theorem” of Clauser, Holt, Shimony and Horne tells us that we must give up at least one of: (1) objective reality (aka “hidden variables”); (2) locality; or (3) time-forwards macroscopic statistics (aka “causality”). The orthodox Copenhagen version of physics gives up the first. The many-worlds theory of Everett and Wheeler gives up the second. The backwards-time theory of physics (BTP) gives up the third. Contrary to conventional wisdom, empirical evidence strongly favors Everett-Wheeler over orthodox Copenhagen. BTP allows two major variations—a many-worlds version and a neoclassical version based on Partial Differential Equations (PDE), in the spirit of Einstein. Section 2 of this paper discusses the origins of quantum measurement according to BTP, focusing on the issue of how we represent condensed matter objects like polarizers in a model “Bell’s Theorem” experiment. The backwards time telegraph (BTT) is not ruled out in BTP, but is highly speculative for now, as will be discussed.
The classic paper of Clauser et al proved that Bell's Theorem experiments rule out all theories of physics which assume locality, time-forwards causality and the existence of an objective real world. The Backwards-Time Interpretation (BTI) tries to recover realism and locality by permitting backwards time causality. BTI should permit dramatic simplification of the assumptions or axioms of physics, but requires new work in fundamental mathematics, such as new tools for the "closure of turbulence," the derivation of statistics generated by ODE or PDE. Recent events like the Delayed Choice Quantum Eraser experiment of Kim, Shih et al have increased mainstream interest in the possibility of backwards causality. The Backwards Time Quantum Teleportation (BTQT) experiment will take this further. True backwards time communication channels (BTCC) are absolutely impossible in most formulations of quantum theory but only almost impossible in the BTI formulation. This paper discusses BTQT, the issue of backwards causality in different versions of quantum theory and new mathematical developments. It defines a new object, the "entropy matrix," which leads to closure of turbulence for PDE systems. Predictions of a common toy field theory (real phi-3 QFT) are reproduced by the corresponding PDE model combined with a new model of the micro/macro interface (2M/M).
A locality property expressing the idea that causal influences can propagate only forward in time, from earlier cause to later effect, and no faster than light is shown to be mathematically incompatible with certain predictions of quantum theory. The contradiction is proved without invoking any additional assumptions such as realism or hidden variables that contravene conventional quantum thinking. The failure of this locality property refines ideas about the theory of relativity, and opens the way to an objective interpretation of quantum theory that may expand its domain of applicability outside the one circumscribed by the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation.
Everett’s many-worlds or multiverse theory is an attempt to find an alternative to the standard Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. Everett’s theory is often claimed to be local in the Bell sense. Here, we show that this is not the case and debunk the contradictions by analyzing in detail the Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger (GHZ) nonlocality theorem. We discuss and compare different notions of locality often mixed in the Everettian literature and try to explain the nature of the confusion. We conclude with a discussion of probability and statistics in the many-worlds theory and stress that the strong symmetry existing between branches in the theory prohibits the definition of probability and that the theory cannot recover statistics. The only way out from this contradiction is to modify the theory by adding hidden variables à la Bohm and, as a consequence, the new theory is explicitly Bell-nonlocal.
J.S. Bell's remarkable 1964 theorem showed that any theory sharing the empirical predictions of orthodox quantum mechanics would have to exhibit a surprising – and, from the point of view of relativity theory, very troubling – kind of nonlocality. Unfortunately, even still on this 50th anniversary, many commentators and textbook authors continue to misrepresent Bell's theorem. In particular, one continues to hear the claim that Bell's result leaves open the option of concluding either nonlocality or the failure of some unorthodox “hidden variable” (or “determinism” or “realism”) premise. This mistaken claim is often based on a failure to appreciate the role of the earlier 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen in Bell's reasoning. After briefly reviewing this situation, I turn to two alternative versions of quantum theory – the “many worlds” theory of Everett and the quantum Bayesian interpretation of Fuchs, Schack, Caves, and Mermin – that purport to provide actual counterexamples to Bell's claim that nonlocality is required to account for the empirically verified quantum predictions. After analyzing each theory's grounds for claiming to explain the EPR–Bell correlations locally, however, one can see that (despite a number of fundamental differences) the two theories share a common for-all-practical-purposes (FAPP) solipsistic character. This dramatically undermines such theories’ claims to provide a local explanation of the correlations and thus, by concretizing the ridiculous philosophical lengths to which one must go to elude Bell's own conclusion, reinforces the assertion that nonlocality really is required to coherently explain the empirical data. Introduction Fifty years ago, in 1964 [1], John Stewart Bell first proved the theorem that has become widely known as “Bell's Theorem” but that Bell himself instead referred to as the “locality inequality theorem” [2]. In Bell's own view, the theorem showed that the empirical predictions of local theories will be constrained by Bell's inequality (or as Bell himself preferred to call it, the “locality inequality”). Hence, nonlocality is a necessary feature of any theory that shares the empirical predictions of standard quantum mechanics.
This paper starts with the observation that the combination of the so-calld EPR argument and Bell's theorem reveals one of the most paradoxical features of quantum reality, i.e. the no-separability of two contingent events. If we accept the conclusion of the revised EPR argument together with Bell's theorem, we are necessarily led to the denial of local causality which was presupposed by the original version of Einstein's criticism against quantum physics.. As the concept of local causality is a cornerstone of Einstein's theory of relativity, we next consider the problem of compatibility between the theory of relativity and quantum physics. Popper's proposal of going back to Lorentz's theory is examined and rejected because the quantum correlation of EPR is not to be interpreted as “an action at a distance” which we can control and use as the operational definition of absolute simultaneity. An inquiry into something like aether as hidden reality behind the theory of relativity is considered as retrogressive as the so-called hidden variable theory of quantum physics. Accepting the non-separability of local elements of reality as the undeniable fact, we discuss the possibility of a realistic interpretation of quantum physics which transcends scientific materialism and classical determinism. As an example of such projects, Stapp's theory is examined with respect to a Whiteheadean process philosophy which provides the meta-physical background for his realistic interpretation of quantum physics. Finally, we present another version of quantum meta-physics based on “the philosophy of organism” which is broad enough to include observer and observed, local causality and non-local correlation, space and time, and potentiality and actuality in the inseparable unity of physical reality.
Bell's Theorem assumes that hidden variables are not influenced by future measurement settings. The assumption has sometimes been questioned, but the suggestion has been thought outlandish, even by the taxed standards of the discipline. (Bell thought that it led to fatalism.) The case for this reaction turns out to be surprisingly weak, however. We show that QM easily evades the standard objections to advanced action. And the approach has striking advantages, especially in avoiding the apparent conflict between Bell's Theorem and special relativity. The second part of the paper considers the broader question as to why advanced action seems so counterintuitive. We investigate the origins of our ordinary intuitions about causal asymmetry. It is argued that the view that the past does not depend on the future is largely anthropocentric, a kind of projection of our own temporal asymmetry. Many physicists have also reached this conclusion, but have thought that if causation has no objective direction, there is no objective content to an advanced action interpretation of QM. This turns out to be a mistake. From the ordinary subjective perspective, we can distinguish two sorts of objective world: one "looks as if" it contains only forward causation, the other ``looks as if'' it involves a mix of backward and forward causation. This clarifies the objective core of an advanced action interpretation of QM, and shows that there is an independent symmetry argument in favour of the approach.