We analyze the distribution of secure keys using quantum cryptography based on the continuous variable degree of freedom of entangled photon pairs. We derive the information capacity of a scheme based on the spatial entanglement of photons from a realistic source, and show that the standard measures of security known for quadrature-based continuous variable quantum cryptography (CV-QKD) are inadequate. A specific simple eavesdropping attack is analyzed to illuminate how secret information may be distilled well beyond the bounds of the usual CV-QKD measures.
We analyze the distribution of secure keys using quantum cryptography based on the continuous variable degree of freedom of entangled photon pairs. We derive the information capacity of a scheme based on the spatial entanglement of photons from a realistic source, and show that the standard measures of security known for quadrature-based continuous variable quantum cryptography (CV-QKD) are inadequate. A specific simple eavesdropping attack is analyzed to illuminate how secret information may be distilled well beyond the bounds of the usual CV-QKD measures.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) provides a method for securely sharing a secret key between two distant parties, Alice and Bob, by leveraging the principles of quantum mechanics. This thesis focuses on Continuous-Variable (CV) QKD, a variant of QKD where information is encoded in the quadrature components of coherent light states, allowing for efficient and cost-effective detection using homodyne or heterodyne receivers. The thesis is divided into three main parts: an introduction to quantum cryptography concepts, the presentation of a CV-QKD protocol, and a detailed security proof of the protocol against different types of attacks. The security proof considers both finite and infinite symbol transmission and tackles various eavesdropping attacks, including individual, collective, and coherent attacks. The use of Gaussian states and operations provides a promising approach to enhance QKD security, particularly in the context of practical quantum cryptography. The final sections provide a mathematical framework for the optimization of secure key rates and strategies for addressing the photon-number cutoff assumption in practical implementations.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols allow two trusted parties to distribute a cryptographic key which they can further use for the unconditionally secure classical communication. During the last decades the field has grown mature with the commercial prototypes being available. They mostly rely on the faint laser pulses implementing the protocols on the basis of single qubits and qubit pairs. Alternatively, the continuous-variable (CV) protocols based on the multi-photon states of light were developed recently. They are typically built using the quadrature modulation of the coherent or squeezed states and subsequent homodyne detection. In the case of Gaussian modulation the security of the protocols is based on the extremality of Gaussian states, which allows estimating bounds on the leaked information. The Gaussian CV QKD protocols were shown secure for any degree of channel attenuation, but are restricted by the channel noise. Moreover, the applicability of Gaussian CV QKD protocols is limited by the effectiveness of classical post-processing algorithms, used by the trusted parties to process the measured data and distill the cryptographic key. On the other hand, the squeezedstate CV QKD protocols were previously considered ineffective under limited degrees of squeezing, while strong squeezing remains experimentally challenging. In the present work we distinguish between the classical and quantum resources in the Gaussian CV QKD and address the role of nonclassicality in the Gaussian protocols. We demonstrate, that by properly combining squeezed resource and coherent modulation, trusted parties are able to decouple eavesdropper from the channel, thus being able to establish the secure key from any amount of the classical mutual information. Our result shows a very promising path towards the long-distance CV QKD.
This thesis is concerned with the study and analysis of two quantum cryptographic protocols: quantum key distribution (QKD) and unforgeable quantum money in the continuous-variable (CV) framework. The main advantage of CV protocols is that their implementation only requires standard telecom components. QKD allows two distant parties, Alice and Bob, to establish a secure key, even in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. The remarkable property of QKD is that its security can be established in the information-theoretic setting, without appealing to any computational assumptions. Proving the security of CV-QKD protocols is challenging since the protocols are described in an infinite-dimensional Fock space. One of the open questions in CV-QKD was establishing security for two-way QKD protocols against general attacks. We exploit the invariance of Unitary group U(n) of the protocol to establish composable security against general attacks. We answer another pressing question in the field of CV-QKD with a discrete modulation by establishing the asymptotic security of such protocols against collective attacks. We provide a general technique to derive a lower bound on the secret key rate by formulating the problem as a semidefinite program. Quantum money exploits the no-cloning property of quantum mechanics to generate unforgeable tokens, banknotes, and credit cards. We propose a CV private-key quantum money scheme with classical verification. The motivation behind this protocol is to facilitate the process of practical implementation. Previous classical verification money schemes use single-photon detectors for verification, while our protocols use coherent detection.
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) has emerged as a promising approach for secure quantum communication, offering advantages such as high key generation rates, compatibility with standard telecommunication infrastructure, and potential for integration on photonic chips. This review provides an accessible introduction to the theory of CV-QKD, aimed at researchers entering this rapidly developing field. We focus on fundamental concepts, key protocols, and security analysis essential for understanding CV-QKD systems, with a special emphasis on prepare-and-measure protocols using coherent states under asymptotic security conditions. We explain their equivalence to entanglement-based protocols and detail the security proof framework against collective attacks, encompassing both Gaussian and discrete modulation schemes. We also briefly address more advanced topics, including measurement-device-independent CV-QKD and finite-size security analysis. This work is motivated by Brazil's growing investment in quantum communication technologies. By presenting a clear learning path from basic concepts to advanced topics, this work aims to equip newcomers with the essential tools to engage with current research in CV-QKD, thereby supporting the training of a new generation of researchers in this strategic field.
A fully general approach to the security analysis of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) is presented. Provided that the quantum channel is estimated via the covariance matrix of the quadratures, Gaussian attacks are shown to be optimal against all collective eavesdropping strategies. The proof is made strikingly simple by combining a physical model of measurement, an entanglement-based description of CV-QKD, and a recent powerful result on the extremality of Gaussian states [M. M. Wolf, Phys. Rev. Lett. 96, 080502 (2006)10.1103/PhysRevLett.96.080502].
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is fundamentally different from most classical key distribution schemes, such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange, in the sense that no computational complexity assumption is required on the power of adversaries to prove its security. QKD relies on basic laws of quantum physics and it is proven that it can enable highly secure data communication. Such achievements, however, are facing technological problems that have to be resolved in order to provide a viable solution to a large group of customers. While there are discrete-variable QKD schemes, which rely on encoding data in discrete degrees of freedom, such as polarization of single photons, in this thesis, we focus on the continuous-variable QKD (CV-QKD) protocols, in which data is encoded on the quadratures of light. Currently, one of the major drawbacks of CV-QKD is its poor performance at long distances. Nevertheless, such a limitation in CV-QKD can be overcome with the assistance of quantum repeaters that rely on entanglement distillation via noiseless linear amplifiers (NLAs). Such systems can, in principle, offer large secret key rates over long distances. In this thesis, we aim to provide a realistic analysis of a CV-QKD protocol running over quantum scissors (QSs) as realistic NLAs. We will report the obstacles that one could face in realizing CV-QKD in such a scenario. A review of CV-QKD and QS-based NLAs will be given, based on which QS-assisted CV-QKD is proposed. We, particularly, focus on the modelling of the QSs' structure and their effect on the secret key rate aiming to find operational regimes where the performance of the QKD scheme is enhanced. This study paves the way for implementing long-distance CV-QKD protocols that rely on QS/NLA devices over CV quantum repeaters. \n \nIn this thesis, we also consider and account for a realistic analysis of a CV-QKD protocol with non-Gaussian modulation, which is assisted by the means of QSs. We will show that, while we have to deal with similar obstacles as in the Gaussian modulation, we can potentially improve performance of the non-Gaussian modulation protocol. \n \nAs an alternative approach to extend the secure distance of CV-QKD protocols, the last part of this thesis is devoted to presenting realistic threat models for satellite QKD, wherein we consider several eavesdropping scenarios by limiting eavesdroppers' access to the trusted ground and/or satellite stations. In such scenarios, the eavesdropper has only limited access to the sender and/or receiver stations. \nFor example, we will explore the case where an eavesdropper can only receive an attenuated version of the transmitted signals. As well, we will focus on the case where Eve's signals would reach the receiver via a lossy channel inaccessible to the eavesdropper. We show that, in the case of both Gaussian and non-Gaussian protocols, this limitation would allow trusted parties to achieve higher key rates than what can be achieved when unrestricted eavesdropping is possible.