In this short comment to a recent contribution by E. Manousakis [1] it is argued that the reported agreement between the measured time evolution of conscious states during binocular rivalry and predictions derived from quantum mechanical formalisms does not require any direct effect of QM. The recursive consumption analysis process in the Ouroboros Model can yield the same behavior.
In this short comment to a recent contribution by E. Manousakis [1] it is argued that the reported agreement between the measured time evolution of conscious states during binocular rivalry and predictions derived from quantum mechanical formalisms does not require any direct effect of QM. The recursive consumption analysis process in the Ouroboros Model can yield the same behavior.
I discuss briefly the foundations of quantum cognition taking as reference an article that appeared on Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience Keywords: consciousness, quantum state, mixed state, probability distribution, dominance duration, quantum superposition principle, quantum collapse, quantum cognition , cognitive science In Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience , general commentary , the authors M. Reza Paraan, F. Bakouie and S. Gharibzadeh ,in date 20 February , 2014(doi:10.3389/fncom.2014.00015) (Paraan M.R. et al, 2014) published a paper entitled A More Realistic Quantum Mechanical Model of Conscious Perception During Binocularly rivalry , discussing and criticizing the basic experimental and theoretical results that I and Khrennikov obtained (Conte E. et al.,2009) examining the possible role of quantum mechanics during the perception and the cognition of ambiguous figures. First of all we retain that , in order to criticize the results of authors , it is appropriate that scholars are aware about all the articulated research that the criticized authors have explained about the matter so to be sure to have fully explored all the obtained results. This is the reason to report in references a long list of publications that such authors have realized (). Unfortunately it may happen that scholars sometimes have not the opportunity to look at all the scientific production of another author and in some cases instead it may contribute to a better definition of his/her production. The feature that such authors seem to outline , is contained in the following their sentence : Technically, a wave-function is a superposition of all the real possible states of a quantum system. We believe that this is an inappropriate take on the problem which leads to inconsistencies within the model. The developers of these two quantum mechanical models believe that the actualization of each quantum state is equal to the activation of neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) of the corresponding perception; a state is actualized when a quantum system is measured (observed) and subsequently its wave-function collapses to that constituent state. Therefore, we believe that wave-function is not a legitimate representation, because it does not describe a real state of a system and is doomed to collapse, and on the other hand, specific NCC of MS (Mixed States duration) or that of indeterminate perception demand a distinct associated quantum state. Their model takes into account the periods when their subjects report indeterminate perception. Indeterminate perception resembles MS in that they are both mental states and are mediated by specific neural correlates. But Conte et al. represent indeterminacy state by the wave-function of the two-state system rather than an additional third quantum state. Technically, a wave-function is a superposition of all the real possible states of a quantum system. We believe that this is an inappropriate take on the problem which leads to inconsistencies within the model (Paraan M.R. et al, 2014).
It has been suggested that consciousness plays an important role in quantum mechanics as it is necessary for the collapse of wave function during the measurement. Furthermore, this idea has spawned a symmetrical proposal: a possibility that quantum mechanics explains the emergence of consciousness in the brain. Here we formulated several predictions that follow from this hypothetical relationship and that can be empirically tested. Some of the experimental results that are already available suggest falsification of the first hypothesis. Thus, the suggested link between human consciousness and collapse of wave function does not seem viable. We discuss the constraints implied by the existing evidence on the role that the human observer may play for quantum mechanics and the role that quantum mechanics may play in the observer's consciousness.
The validity of the assertion that some recent double-slit interference experiments, conducted by Radin et al., would have tested the possible role of the experimenter's mind in the collapse of the quantum wave function, is questioned. It is emphasized that quantum mechanics doesn't need any psychophysical ingredient to explain the measurement processes, and therefore parapsychologists shouldn't resort to the latter to support the possibility of psychokinesis, but search for more convincing explanations.
It is argued that the principles of classical physics are inimical to the development of a satisfactory science of consciousness. The problem is that insofar as the classical principles are valid consciousness can have no effect on the behavior, and hence on the survival prospects, of the organisms in which it inheres. Thus within the classical framework it is not possible to explain in natural terms the development of consciousness to the high-level form found in human beings. In quantum theory, on the other hand, consciousness can be dynamically efficacious: quantum theory does allows consciousness to influence behavior, and thence to evolve in accordance with the principles of natural selection. However, this evolutionary requirement places important constraints upon the details of the formulation of the quantum dynamical principles. To appear in the proceedings of the conference Toward a Science Of Consciousness: University of Arizona, Tucson, April 8-13. 1996. 1. The Inadequacy ...
In recent decades, progress in the field of neurosciences has triggered an interest in understanding mind-brain relationships. Quantum Mechanics (QM) has been present in the debate from its beginnings through the well-known measurement paradox. The standard interpretation of QM considers two basic, fundamentally irreducible, processes: the deterministic evolution of the wave-function according to the Schrodinger equation, once the initial conditions have been settled; and the indeterministic wave-function collapse into one of the possible outcomes, after performing a specific measurement. So, QM would point to the limits of a purely deterministic view of nature and, in particular, of brains. Nevertheless, QM’s relevance for the brain’s physics is still to be proven. Detractors of the QM influence are confident of the role of decoherent processes at different physical scales in order to ensure a classical deterministic behavior of the brain. However, little attention is paid to the epistemic implications of invoking decoherence for the mind-brain problem. In this paper, (i) we present lasting QM models stating a specific view of human consciousness and make explicit their position regarding the relationship between the physical activity of neurons and/or networks of neurons and the phenomenal conscious experience; (ii) we review the main criticisms of the relevance of QM in the brain and, most importantly, we bring out the philosophical implications behind the usual recourse to decoherence in the transition from the quantum to the classical world, explaining why the mind-brain problem and the measurement paradox should not be disentangled.