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arXiv:0707.4169

Typicality Defended

Don Nelson Page

Published Jul 27, 2007• 13 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Hartle and Srednicki have argued that there is no observational evidence favoring our typicality. Here it is shown that such evidence does arise from including the `normalization principle' requirement that the sum of the likelihoods for all possible observations is normalized to unity in each theory.
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.0707.4169

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